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AN FBI VIEWPOINT REGARDING
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
William H. Webster*
INTRODUCTION**
When former President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) into law on July 4, 1966, his action inaugurated a new era of
public access to records maintained by the federal government's executive
branch. 1 "This legislation," Johnson stated, "springs from one of our most
essential principles: a democracy works best when the people have all the
information that the security of the [nlation permits . . .-2
Although the Act became effective one year later, initially few people used
it to obtain government records because the public was probably unfamiliar
with its provisions or even its existence.3 Also, the Act exempted many records
from dissemination. The FBI seldom received a processable FOIA request since
the statute exempted investigatory files.
By the early 1970's, popular concerns about government secrecy in general,
and bureaucratic intractability in complying with the FOIA in particular,
sparked Congressional debate regarding the Act. Ultimately, to make the FOIA
more effective and responsive to public desires, Congress amended the law in
1974.4 As a result of these amendments, federal law enforcement agencies 5 were
required to disclose records that had been exempted from FOIA disclosure.
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**To preclude the possibility of violating the privacy rights of individuals whose identity would not otherwise
be widely known, the FBI has adopted a policy of not disseminating the specific details of any given case
whenever possible. In addition, in those instances in which the FBI's experience or internal records serve
as the basis for a fact or statement set forth within the article, no citation has been used. While the article
which follows is therefore not footnoted in the traditional manner, in the opinion of the FBI and the editors
its utility is not adversely impaired.
1. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1976 and Supp. 1979).
2. President's message: "Availability of Government Records and Information," 2 Weekly Comp. of Pres.
Doc. 895 (July II, 1966).
3. Requests for information from the FBI pursuant to the FOIA for the years 1967 through 1972 totaled
approximately fifty. Requests for the subsequent years are as follows:
1973 ....................................... 64 1977 ....................... 18,026
1974 ..................................... 447 1978 ......................... 18,084
1975 ................................ 13,881 1979 .............................. 14,925
1976 ................................ 15,7 78
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561). This amendment
substituted "investigatory records" for "investigatory files." Also, segregable portions of records no
longer fell under the exemptions.
5. E.g., the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Drug Enforcement Administration
and the United States Secret Service.
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Congress intended the 1974 Amendments to strike a better balance between
the need to disclose information to ensure an informed citizenry and the need
to protect information in the interests of national security and effective law
enforcement.
Our experience establishes that the 1974 amendments have not met that
goal. Instead, the balance favors disclosure. While the FBI is committed to
the basic concept of public disclosure, the FOIA continues to have a debilitating
effect on FBI investigative operations. Undeniably, the release of information
has produced a better understanding of FBI activities; but the requirment that
we review and disclose information from raw investigative files increases the
danger of releasing sensitive information. Moreover, responding to FOIA
requests has placed overwhelming demands on FBI resources, which, in turn,
adversely impacts both on our FOIA responses to the public and on our
investigative capabilities.
THE FOIA-ITS HISTORY AND
APPLICABILITY TO FBI RECORDS
Legislation addressing maintenance of government records in this country
can be traced at least as far back as passage of the Housekeeping Acts of
1789.6 These laws, which gave all federal offices the authority to establish
recordkeeping and retrieval systems, were not significantly altered until passage
of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (Section 3) which addressed
access to records. 7 None of these laws, however, provided broad public access
to federal records. In 1958, to extend public access, Congress passed a law
amending the original 1789 records legislation to state that it did "not authorize
withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of records
to the public."'8
Despite this legislation, most agencies continued to adhere to individual
interpretations of both the "housekeeping statute" and Section 3, and refused
to release any records unless a person could present a compelling "need to
know." Determined to ensure more liberal access, Congress, in 1966, passed
the Freedom of Information Act as an amendment to the Administrative
Procedure Act. The legislation was codified in 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 and, for the
first time, there were workable standards concerning just what records were
available and how the records could be obtained. The "need to know" test
was replaced with the "right to know" standard. Additionally, there were
judicial remedies for persons illegally denied access. 9 To prevent public access
6. Later incorporated into 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) by Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 379.
7. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547, amending 5 U.S.C.
22 (1946).
9. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4) (1976 and Supp. 1979).
e
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from going too far, the Act contained nine specific exemptions to the mandatory
release of information to protect certain data such as national defense secrets,
confidential business information, and investigatory files.' 0
Under one of the nine exemptions, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7), the FBI's
investigative files were exempted from the Act's provisions. As a result, the
Bureau seldom received an FOIA request to which we were required by the
law to respond, and we were able to meet our responsibilities with fewer than
ten full-time employees.
Congress, in the early 1970's, moved by what it perceived as major
shortcomings in federal compliance with the FOIA, conducted a series of
hearings." The Congress decided that FOIA problem areas, such as bureaucratic
delay in complying with requests and the charging of excessive fees for locating
and copying documents, could best be remedied by even more definitive
legislation.
In 1974, Congress passed a series of amendments to the FOIA of 1966,
thus revising 5 U.S.C. § 552. When the amended law took effect in February,
1975, it was, as before, to apply only to agencies of the federal government's
executive branch. 12 As a result of the amendments, these agencies were now
required, for example, to answer requests for information faster and more
completely, and to charge standardized and reasonable fees for those
services. 13 In addition, language was revised in the nine exemptions. Changes
in Exemption (b)(7), designed to cover law enforcement records, greatly affected
the FBI. Now, investigatory records could be withheld only if the dissemination
could result in any of six harms listed below. More important, the language
of the provisions was changed to cover investigatory "records" rather than
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b) (1976). This provision reads as follows:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly
classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this
title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in
such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for
withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available
by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent
that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B)
deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and,
in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a
criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence
investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose
investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by,
on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of
financial institutions; or
(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record
after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection.
II. U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices-Administration and Operation of the Freedom
of Information Act (Parts 4-6): Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (March-April 1972).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1976).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (1976) as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.
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investigatory "files." Entire files no longer were exempted; they had to be
reviewed as to each record they contained, and any harmless record or portion
thereof that could be reasonably segregated from potentially harmful data had
to be provided to any requester.
The amended provision, which remains in effect today, exempts from
disclosure
. . . investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with
enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of
a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of
a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the
confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or
(F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.14
THE IMPACT OF THE
FOIA ON THE FBI
The FOIA, for all of the benefits it has provided, has engendered substantial
administrative and investigative problems impacting both on the FBI and on
the American public.
A. Administrative Problems
The FBI has experienced great difficulty in responding to requests within
the time presently required by the Act. This has produced public dissatisfaction
and caused the FBI temporarily to reallocate needed investigative manpower
to ease backlogs of requests.
Federal agencies are required to respond to FOIA requests within ten
working days regardless of the amount of work required to respond. 15 In
some instances a ten-day extension is possible. 16 Requests can come not only
from American citizens but from "any persons," including even citizens of
hostile foreign countries.
Given the number of people assigned to handle FOIA matters at the
present time, our ability to respond to requests within the specified time
depends principally on the volume of requests we receive and the amount of
searching and review required to meet the requests.
The FBI receives an average of sixty new requests for records daily. Some
requests can be handled quickly and easily since we either do not have the
data the requester is seeking or it is a very simple matter to search Bureau
files for pertinent data and to review it for release. However, in other instances,
such as the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg case, we must retrieve and review
thousands of documents.
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (1976).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B) (1976).
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The FBI has no computer system in use through which we can instantly
retrieve records for FOIA processing. Both the searching of our card index
system and the retrieval of records are done manually. Moreover, there is no
machine that can conduct the tedious and careful review of documents - a
line-by-line review to ensure that the requester receives all the information to
which he or she is entitled but that no exempted information is inadvertently
disclosed.
Despite the fact that we have in excess of 300 persons at FBI Headquarters
handling FOIA matters, the volume of requests has become overwhelming.
This is due principally to requests requiring extensive file searches and reviews
that cannot reasonably be completed within the ten-day or within the twenty-day
response period. Such requests create a backlog because, under the first-in,
first-out system we employ, we must complete them before we handle any
other requests, whether they are easy or complex. A 1978 study' 7 by the
General Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative arm of Congress, stated
that the regular ten-day time limit did not appear to be sufficient, but it
offered no recommendations indicating how we could speed up our responses.
Citizens understandably become dissatisfied when they do not promptly
receive requested data. This dissatisfaction sometimes precipitates lawsuits
which themselves aggravate our response problems. 18 The time spent responding
to lawsuits represents time lost in responding to FOIA requests.
Our administrative problems have precipitated investigative problems. In
order to alleviate the backlog of overdue requests, we have been forced
temporarily to reallocate agents from our already limited investigative complement.
In addition, some sensitive information, such as that which could identify a
confidential source, may be disseminated by mistake when the all-important
review process is hastily conducted to meet a deadline.
B. Investigative Problems
Aside from the impact that administrative problems have on investigations,
the FOIA impinges on the FBI's investigative capabilities in two other significant
ways. First, it affords criminals and hostile foreign governments access to
investigative "trade secrets." Second, it inhibits the vital free flow of information
to the FBI from the public and especially from confidential sources.
Under the law in its present form, any person can request information
from the internal FBI manual that outlines the manner in which our investigations
are conducted. The courts disagree on whether FOIA exemptions may be cited
to protect such information. 19 Therefore, it is possible that a criminal intending
to avoid detection or arrest would use the FOIA to learn FBI investigative
procedures and techniques. For example, we have received many requests for
17. General Accounting Office, "Report by the Comptroller General of the United States: Timeliness and
Completeness of FBI Responses to Requests Under Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts Have
Improved" (April 10, 1979).
18. Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Cleaver v.
Kelly, 415 F. Supp. 174 (D.D.C.), vacated and remanded per curiam No. 76-1831 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
23, 1976), on remand 427 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1976). Exner v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 542
F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1976).
19. See, e.g. Sladek v. Bensinger, 605 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1979), Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, 587 F.2d 544 (2nd Cir. 1978), Cox v. Department of Justice, 601 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.
1979), Cox v. Department of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1978), Cox v. Levi, 592 F.2d 460 (8th
Cir. 1979), and Jordon v. Department of Justice, 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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information from our manuals from prisoners - persons who might be requesting
the information for legitimate purposes but who could also use it to defeat
our law enforcement efforts. Other criminals, foreign governments, and terrorists
can obtain this same information.
Perhaps a more pressing investigative problem the FOIA poses for the FBI
is the declining flow of information to the FBI from potential sources. The
FBI's ability to discharge its responsibilities, which include sensitive investigations
in terrorist, organized crime, and foreign counterintelligence activities, depends
in large measure on the willingness of people to furnish information to us. To
the extent that the FOIA inhibits persons from providing crucial criminal or
counterintelligence information, even if the individual's perception of the
disclosure possibilities is exaggerated, our effectiveness is impaired.
We are not suggesting, of course, that every person who is reluctant to
provide us with information is intimidated by the FOIA. However, we have
found that many potential sources refuse to provide us with information because
they fear disclosure under the FOIA. These people are not only confidential
informants, but also private citizens, businessmen and representatives of municipal
and state governments, including police departments.
The possible disclosure of a source's indentity is a particularly grave concern
to the FBI. Despite the presence of Exemption (b)(7), many potential informants
are reluctant to provide information because they fear that FOIA provisions
permit release of enough information so that a requester can deduce the
identity of an informant. This fear is not unfounded. We have learned of
instances of prisoners attempting to use the data they receive to identify
informants. About 15.3 percent of our FOIA requests in Fiscal Year 1979
were made by or on behalf of prisoners, persons who may or may not have
been attempting to identify informants. The number of these requests is growing
as evidenced by the fact that just over a year ago only nine percent of requests
were made by or for inmates. Nothing in the present FOIA prevents organized
crime groups, terrorist organizations, or representatives of hostile foreign
governments from engaging in similar source identification efforts. Any requester
who possesses the time and resources can examine documents for clues that
could identify an informant.
The FOIA-related reluctance of potential informants to cooperate with the
FBI is illustrated in the following examples:
A confidential source in a position to furnish information concerning Middle
East terrorist matters advised that he did not desire to continue contact with
any representative of the FBI or to furnish information because of fears that
his assistance might become known. The source stated that his concern was
due to various media articles relating to actual or potential FOIA disclosure
of information furnished confidentially to law enforcement agencies.
An informant of one FBI office expressed concern that individuals about whom
he was providing information were requesting their FBI files under the FOIA.
This informant also expressed fear for his personal safety and that of his
family. He had provided reliable and corroborating information about individuals
who have been convicted of federal crimes, but recently there has been a
reduction in amount and quality of his information.
Another field office informant related a conversation that occurred between
himself and several organized crime figures. One individual commented that
within the next few years the FBI will be severely restricted in its efforts to
obtain information from confidential sources. He stated that he fully expected
[Vol. 7: 7
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the provisions of the FOIA would be successfully utilized in identifying FBI
informants. Agents subsequently contacting this valuable source have noted a
subtle reluctance on his part to more fully penetrate the particular organized
crime circles which he is in a position to cover.
In addition, some state and local law enforcement agencies have become
reluctant to share information with the FBI as is evidenced by the following
case:
An FBI office noted a trend to exclude agents working organized crime matters
from key intelligence meetings in their area. Several state and local law
enforcement officers mentioned a concern for the security of information in
connection with the FOIA disclosure as the reason for the closed meetings.
The office undertook efforts through meetings with state and local law
enforcement agencies to improve their understanding of the FOIA legislation.
These efforts have not met with complete success.
By the late 1970's, some members of Congress recognized that federal law
enforcement agencies were experiencing problems obtaining information due to
the FOIA as well as the Privacy Act of 1974,20 which was designed to control
the federal government's collection and use of information about private citizens.
Therefore, in April, 1978, Congress requested a special GAO report on the
effects of the FOIA and the Privacy Act upon these agencies.
The GAO solicited information from the FBI, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the United
States Secret Service, and the Civil Service Commission (now known as the
Office of Personnel Management). Each agency was requested to comment
upon the Acts and to document its problems, where possible, with actual cases.
The GAO also contacted state and local law enforcement agencies in three
states to determine how the FOIA and the Privacy Act were affecting their
interactions with the above federal agencies. The GAO report was issued on
November 15, 1978.21 In part, it said:
We believe that the examples provided by the FBI show that, in some specific
cases, it has taken the FBI longer to apprehend a criminal, that the FBI has
had to spend additional agent hours collecting and/or verifying information,
that the public has been increasingly reluctant to cooperate, and that some
criminals are using the acts to try to obtain sensitive information from law
enforcement agencies. The examples, however, do not show that the FBI or
other law enforcement agencies have been unable to fulfill their investigative
responsibilities. 22
It is difficult for us to conclusively prove that the FOIA has caused a
significant drop in the amount of investigative assistance we receive from
informants, concerned citizens, law enforcement agencies and others. In many
cases we will never be sure why a source, or a potential source, of information
declined to provide vital information to us. We have offered, however, substantial
documentation to support this belief in our submission to the GAO and in
our proposals for amendments to the FOIA.
20. 5 U.S.C. 552(a) (1976).
21. General Accounting Office, "Report of the Comptroller General of the United States: Impact of the
Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts on Law Enforcement Agencies" (November 15, 1978).




TO AMEND THE FOIA
In order to remedy the administrative and investigative problems outlined,
the FBI drafted, in response to Congressional inquiries and interest, a set of
proposals 23 to amend the FOIA. In June, 1979, with the consent of the Attorney
General, the proposals were submitted for review by the Bureau's various
oversight committees on Capitol Hill.
The proposals represent an endeavor to refine the FOIA, not to repeal it.
While the proposals do not necessarily represent the views of the Department
of Justice, which may formally propose its own set of modifications, the FBI
and the Department will work together with Congress toward a balanced
solution of FOIA problems.
None of our proposals suggests more changes than necessary to protect
fundamental law enforcement interests. For example, existing time limits for
responding to requests would be changed to establish a relationship between
the amount of work required in responding to requests and the amount of
time permitted to do the work. The proposals also would change the law to
permit, rather than require, the FBI to disclose its records to felons and
citizens of foreign countries. Additionally, the FBI proposes deleting the
requirement that a record be an investigatory record before it can be protected
under Exemption (b)(7). This proposal would enable the FBI to protect such
noninvestigatory records as manuals and guidelines to the extent the production
of them would cause any of the harms specified in Exemption (b)(7), such
as the disclosure of investigative techniques or interference with enforcement
proceedings.
The proposals would divide all FBI records into two categories. The first
would consist of the most sensitive information the FBI possesses: records
pertaining to foreign intelligence, foreign counter intelligence, organized crime,
and terrorism. The proposals would exempt them from the mandatory disclosure
provisions of the Act. To protect the interests of historical reseachers, Title
28, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.824 which provides for access to
files over fifteen years old of historical interest, will remain in effect with
respect to these sensitive records.
All other FBI records would be in the second category and subject to the
Act's mandatory disclosure provisions.
Several proposals are designed specifically to reestablish the essential free
flow of information from the public to the FBI. Our proposal specifies that
state and municipal agencies and foreign governments merit confidential source
protection when they provide information on a confidential basis. Additionally,
in order that informants' identities may be protected to a greater extent through
the passage of time, the FBI has proposed a moratorium on the release to
anyone of law enforcement records pertaining to law enforcement investigations.
Under this plan the FBI will not be required to release such records for seven
23. Many of the proposals, along with some related suggestions offered by the Central Intelligence Agency,
have been incorporated into H.R. 5129, 96th Congress, 1st Session, introduced on August 2, 1979.
The FBI proposals have also been incorporated into S. 2086 and S. 2087, 96th Congress, 1st Session,
introduced on November 29, 1979.
24. 28 C.F.R. § 50.8 (1979).
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years after termination of the investigation without prosecution or seven years
after prosecution. The FBI will not use the proposed moratorium in concert
with a file destruction program in order to frustrate the FOIA. 25 Finally, to
clearly permit us to withhold seemingly innocuous facts which standing alone
may not identify a source, but which could do so when combined with other
information, our proposal would allow us to withhold information which would
tend to identify a source. This proposal is consistent with the suggestion of
several courts26 and conforms closely to what we believe was the original intent
of Congress. 27
The FBI proposals are not overly restrictive. They would not diminish the
rights and privileges a criminal defendant or civil litigant now possesses under
the rules of civil and criminal procedure, nor would they limit or restrict in
any way the power of the Department of Justice, Congress, or the Courts to
oversee any FBI activity. What they would do is make those adjustments to
the Act that reason and experience suggest are needed to alleviate administrative
and investigative problems impacting on both the FBI and the public.
CONCLUSION
We do not question the need for the FOIA. However, Congress must
ensure that it operates for the greatest good of the American public. As long
as the FOIA continues to inhibit effective law enforcement, we will not have
the proper balance between the public's right to know and the public's right
to be secure. Unless the FOIA is amended to correct this imbalance, the best
interests of the American people will not be served.
25. Since 1946, the FBI, with the approval of the National Archives and Records Service (NARS), has
been engaged in a systematic destruction of obsolete records located in the FBI field offices. While
no comparable program has ever existed for FBI Headquarter files, a proposed record retention plan
was submitted to NARS by the FBI in May, 1977. Pursuant to Federal Law, NARS submitted the
proposed plans to Congress, which has not acted on the plans up to the present time. On June 25,
1979, suit was filed in the Federal District Court for the Disrict of Columbia seeking both preliminary
and permanent injunctions halting the destruction of all FBI files and records (American Friends
Service Committee, et al. v. William H. Webster, et a]., No. 79-1655, (D.D.C. filed June 25,
1979) (order granting preliminary injunction granted January 10, 1980). On January 10, 1980 Judge
Harold H. Greene issued a preliminary injunction in the case and ruled in a memorandum opinion
that the FBI field office and proposed Headquarters' file destruction programs did not meet the
requirements of the Federal Records Management Statute. (44 U.S.C. § 2103, et seq. (1976)).
1 L The order issued in this lawsuit requires the Archivists of the United States (NARS) and his
staff with the assistance of the FBI to formulate a retention plan for FBI records meeting the statutory
standard as interpreted in the memorandum opinion, and it requires the FBI to formulate records
controls schedules consistent with that plan. The court noted that the preliminary injunction will remain
in effect until the court approves the plans and schedules as formulated by the FBI and the NARS.
The preparation of this new plan will of necessity take into account the FOIA to ensure that
the purpose and intent of the FOIA are not frustrated.
26. Nix v. United States, 572 F. 2d 998 (4th Cir. 1978), Church of Scientology v. Department of Justice,
410 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1976), and Mitsubishi Electric Corp, et a]., v. Department of Justice,
No. 76-0813 (D.D.C., 1977).
27. The original intent of Congress concerning sources was summed up by the author of Exemption
(b)(7)(D), the late Senator Philip A. Hart, who stated that the Exemption "protects without exception
and without limitation the identity of informers. It protects both the identity of the informer and
information which might reasonably be found to lead to such disclosure. These may be paid informers
or simply concerned citizens who give information to law enforcement agencies and desire their identity
to be kept confidential." For full text see 120 Cong. Rec. 17034 (1974).
